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Abstract
We theoretically investigates that how rms decide to exports and the extent of
the division of labor under heterogeneous xed export costs. In the equilibrium,
exporters and non-exporters coexists and all exporters behave as borderline rms.
Exporters promote the division of labor more strongly than non-exporters. A decrease
in trade costs raises the cut o export xed costs. It expands rm size and promotes
the division of labor of exporters, while it shrinks rm size and make non-exporters
refrain from the division of labor. These links between the cut o xed export costs
and the division of labor of exporters and non-exporters bring a new insight for the
research line of trade and heterogeneous xed export costs
Keywords: heterogeneous xed export costs; division of labor within rms; export
decision
JEL classication numbers : F12
1 Introduction
How do rms decide to export ? These questions are important theoretically and empiri-
cally. To answer the questions, many trade economists have studied the trade model with
rm heterogeneity since Melitz (2003). There are two problem in these models.
The rst problem is about xed export costs. In explaining this division, xed export
costs, such as distributing costs and advertising expenses, play a key role. In this regards,
many trade models have assumed that xed export costs are identical across rms. Is this
Corresponding author. Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida Honmachi, Sakyo-
ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan. E-mail address: shintaku.shitanku@gmail.com. I am grateful to Naoto Jinji,
Keita Kamei, Hiroaki Sasaki, and Akihisa Shibata for their helpful comments.
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assumption empirically valid ? Bugameli and Infante (2003) emphasized the importance of
ability to collect the information of export market using a survey of Italian manufacturing
rms. This implies that xed export costs. are very dierent from each other.
The second problem is about rm organization. Many trade models have assumed that
rm productivity is exogenous but many studies have indicated that trade liberalization
reorganizes rm structure and changes rm productivity. In particular, Zadeh (2013)
showed that trade liberalization changes the extent of the division of labor within rms.
We focus on the division of labor within rms for rm organization.
It is natural to think that heterogeneous xed export costs and the extent of the division
of labor within rms aect export decision. However, there are quite few papers to analyze
this relationship. Then, in this paper we make clear theoretically that how rms decide to
exports and the extent of the division of labor under heterogeneous xed export costs.
We adopt the same model as that of Shintaku (2015,a) for an autarkic economy. We
incorporate heterogeneous xed export costs following Jorgensen and Schroder (2008).
That is, rms engage in investment to start a business. After that, rms can observe
export xed costs which are random variables. Then, rms decide to export and the extent
of the division of labor. The model determines the rm size and the cuto value of export
xed costs simultaneously. For rms which have such a cuto value, to export or not are
indierent.
This paper's main results are as follows. In the equilibrium, exporters and non-exporters
coexists and all exporters produce output and input labor by the same amount as borderline
rms. Exporters promotes the division of labor stronger than non-exporters. A decrease in
trade costs raises the cut o export xed costs. It reduces the number of rms, and non-
exporters, while raising the number of exporters. It aects not only output of exporters
but also that of non-exporters. It expand rm size and promotes the division of labor of
exporters, while it shrinks rm size and refrains the division of labor of non-exporters.
A few papers analyzes heterogeneous xed export costs. Schhmitt and Yu (2001) in-
dicated that a decrease in transport costs and an increase in xed costs for domestic
market raise the number of traded goods. These results mean a positive link between
scale economies and the volume of intra-industry trade. Jorgensen and Schroder (2006)
presented a model similar to Schhmitt and Yu (2001) but focused on the tari reduction in
trade liberalization. They indicated that the sum of available home and foreign varieties
increases for small taris. Furthermore, welfare increases for small taris and falls for large
taris. That is, there exists a welfare maximization tari. These models impose zero prot
condition for non-exporters, but Jorgensen and Schroder (2008) does not impose it. Jor-
gensen and Schroder (2008) rather treats entry process such as Melitz (2003). That is, rms
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must pay sunk cost to enter the market and after the entry, they observe their xed export
costs. In such a model, Jorgensen and Schroder (2008) indicated that there exists a welfare
maximization tari as Jorgensen, Philipp and Schroder (2006). This paper adopt entry
process following Jorgensen and Schroder (2008). While the above models treats constant
marginal cost model, however, this paper treats variable marginal cost model based on the
division of labor. Then, two types of rms which have dierent extents of the division of
labor are generated endogenously. Those extents depend on the cut o xed export costs.
These links bring a new insight for the research line of trade and heterogeneous xed export
costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes trading equilibrium.
Section 3 analyzes trade liberalization. Finally, we present the conclusion and Appendix.
2 Trading equilibrium
We adopt the same model as that of Shintaku (2015,a) for an autarkic economy. We
extend the model by incorporating heterogeneous xed export costs following Jorgensen
and Schroder (2008). There are two identical countries (home and foreign). We focus on
home country without loss of generality. We use superscripts e and ne for variables of
exporters and non-exporters, respectively. We focus on an equilibrium in which exporters
and non-exporters coexist.
2.1 Entry and heterogeneous export xed costs
Firms investment wfe to start a business. Representative household nance wfe. We let
M be the number of rms which engage in the investment. We focus on an equilibrium in
which all rms which started a business do not exit. That is, M is equal to the number
of operating rms. After the investment, rms observe the degree of diculty of accessing
export market,  2 [0;1). The random variable,  has a probability density function,
g() and cumulative distribution function, G(). Firms decide to enter the export market.
For the rms which have , whether the rms should export or not is indierent. We call
such rms "borderline rms". G()M and [1   G()]M of rms are exporters and non-
exporters, respectively. After production and sale, all rms die with probability 1 following
Jorgensen and Schroder (2008).
All rms must pay xed costs FCd to operate in the domestic market. FCd is given
by wfd. Firms which have  must pay xed cost FCx to enter the export market. FCx is
given by FCx() = fx. Therefore, total cost function of non-exporters and exporters are
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given sa follows:
TCne(yne) = V C(yne) + FCd = (2fy
ne)1=2 + wfd;
TCe(yet ; ) = V C(y
e
t ) + FCd + FCx() = (2fy
e
t )
1=2 + w(fd + fx);
where yet represents total output of exporters. We should note that total cost function of
exporters, TCe(yet ; ) depends on .
2.2 Equilibrium allocation
Pricing rule of non-exporters and exporters are given by PP ne : pned = MC(y
ne) and PP e :
ped = MC(y
e), respectively. That is, we can obtain pne=w = (B+1)(2f)1=2(yne) 1=2. and
ped=w = (B+1)(2f)
1=2(yet )
 1=2 respectively, where B  =2  1. Final good market clear-
ing condition for non-exporter and exporter of home country are given by yne = cne and
yet = y
e
d+ y
e
x = ce+ c
0
e, respectively, where cnerepresents consumption of the home house-
hold for home non-exporters and cerepresents that for home exporters and c
0
e represents
consumption of the foreign household for imported brands from home country. Asterisk
(*) in superscript represents economic entities of foreign country and "0" in superscript
represents imported brands.
Relative quantity of exporters to non-exporters can be obtained from nal good market
clearing conditions of exporter's good, and those of non-exporter's good. These conditions
and optimal pricing conditions gives the following condition, RGMC1):
RGMC :
yet
yne
= (1 +  1 )
2
2  : (1)
(1) immediately derives the following proposition.
Proposition 1. All exporters behave in the same way when outputs of non-exporters are
positive.
By multiplying both sides of pne=w and ped=w by yt, we have revenues, r
ne = pneyne =
w(B + 1)(2fyne)1=2 and ret = p
e
dy
e
t = w(B + 1)(2fy
e
t )
1=2.
From rne, re, TCne(yne), TCe(ye), and (1), we can obtain the following conditions:
ne(yne)
w
= A (yne)1=2   fd; (2)
1) RGMC can derived in the similar manner with (4) of Shintaku (2015,b)
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e(yne; )
w
= A (yet )
1=2   (fd + fx) = (1 +  1 ) 12 A (yne)1=2   (fd + fx); (3)
where A is dened as follows:
A  B(2f)1=2:
We should note that prot of exporters, e(yne)=w depends on  and yne from TCe(yet ; )
and (1).
We let ~ represents expected prot before rms start a business and from (2) and (3),
this is given by
~  [1 G()]ne(yne) +
Z 
0
e(yne; )g()d:
Free-entry condition is given by
FE : ~ = wfe: (4)
This equation characterizes the relation between  and yne.
We let expected value of  conditional on    be E[j  ]. That is, this is given
by
E[j  ] 
Z 
0
g()d:
By using (4) and E[j  ], we can obtain equilibrium output of non-exporters, yneT j for
given  as follows:
yneT j =

fe + fd + fxE[j  ]
A(HG() + 1)
2
; (5)
where H is dened as follows:
H  (1 +  1 )1=(2 )   1:
Then, we adopt the following assumption to obtain the internal solution.
Assumption 1. We assume B > 0. That is, 2 <  and 1 <  < 2 hold.
From 1 <  < 2 of Assumption 1 and  > 1, H > 0 holds. From B > 0 of Assumption
1, A is also positive from A  B(2f)1=2.
(1) and (5) derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, for all  > 0,
1. (pned =w)T j, (p
e
d=w)T j, y
e
t;T j, y
ne
T j, t
e
T j, t
ne
T j, l
e
t;T j, and l
ne
T j are positive.
2. (pned =w)T j > (p
e
d=w)T j, y
e
t;T j > y
ne
T j, t
e
T j > t
ne
T j, and l
e
t;T j > l
ne
T j hold.
yet;T j > y
ne
T j can be explained as follows. If MC is constant (no division of labor), (1)
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becomes yet =yne = 1 + 
1 . That is, even if there are is division of labor, yet;T j > y
ne
T j
must holds to satises nal good market conditions. When there are is division of labor,
inequality of outputs is expanded. Without the division of labor, both type of rms have
the same price for domestic market, pd. In (1), from 2=(2 ) > 1, (1+  1 )[2=(2 )] >
1 +  1  holds. This indicates that exporters promote the division of labor stronger than
non-exporters and then, ped < p
ne
d holds. This expands the inequality of outputs.
By substituting yet;T j of (5) for 
ne(yne) of (2) and e(yne; ) of (3), we can obtain
equilibrium prot of non-exporters and exporters, neT j and 
e
T j respectively, for given 
as follows:
neT j
w
=
fe + fxE[j  ] HG()fd
(HG() + 1)
;
eT j()
w
=
(H + 1)fe +H(1 G())fd + [(H + 1)E[j  ]  (HG() + 1)]fx
(HG() + 1)]
:
 is characterized by the following cut o condition (CO):
CO : e() = ne():
CO, neT j=w, and 
e
T j()=w, give non-linear equation which characterize equilibrium value
of , T as follows:
T =
H
fx
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]
(HG(T ) + 1)
: (6)
Then, (pned =w)T , (p
e
d=w)T , y
e
t;T , y
ne
T , t
e
T , t
ne
T , l
e
t;T , and l
ne
T can be characterized.
Labor market clearing condition is given by
L = Mfe|{z}
Investment
+
Non-exportersz }| {
[1 G()]Mlne+
Exportersz }| {
G()Mlet| {z }
Production
:
By substituting let;T and l
ne
T for this equation, we can obtain MT as follows:
MT =
2B
2B + 1
L
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ] : (7)
Then, we can characterize the equilibrium completely. We assume the following condition
to obtain the equilibrium in which exporters and non-exporters coexist.
Assumption 2. We assume T > (Hfd)=fx.
Proposition 3. If and only if Assumption 1 and 2 hold, the equilibrium in exporters and
non-exporters coexist is determined uniquely.
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Proof: See Appendix A.
Assumption 2 certies (ne=w)T > 0. Otherwise, non-exporters exit.
3 Trade Liberalization
We consider a decrease in  as trade liberalization. We can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1 and 2, the following properties hold.
1. A decrease in  raises the cut o value of xed export costs, T .
2. A decrease in  reduces the number of rms, MT and non-exporters, [1 G(T )]MT
while raises the number of exporters, G(T )MT .
3. A decrease in  shrinks rm size and refrains the division of labor of non-exporters
(reduces yneT and t
ne
T ), while expand rm size and promotes the division of labor of exporters
(raises yeT and t
e
T ).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Property 1 of Proposition 4 is natural. A decrease in  raises marginal revenue of
exporters and this makes some non-exporters enter the export market.
Next, we consider property 2 of Proposition 4. A decrease in  raises the the cut o ,
directly raises the number of exporters and reduces that of non-exporters (cut o eect).
However, exporters input a lot of labor into production and headquarter division and they
absorb a lot of labor from the non-export rms and starting rms. This eect reduces the
number of all rms (entry eect). In export rms, cut o eect dominates entry eect
while in non-export rms, cut o eect is dominated by entry eect. We should note that
entry eect does not describe the exit process such as Melitz (2003) but that it describes
the entry process. That is, the number of non-exporters decreases because entry decreases.
Finally, we consider property 3 of Proposition 4. Remember that T and y
ne
T are deter-
mined by free entry and cut o conditions. If  decreases keeping T , prot of exporters
increases. This violates free entry condition and then, causes new new entry. This makes
exporters reduce output and this reduce also output of non-exporters from (1). If a de-
crease in  raises T keeping y
e
t;T , this reduce prot of exporters while this does not change
prot of non-exporters. This violates cuto condition and makes exporters raises output.
This leads to a increase in yneT following (1). In export rms, the latter eect dominates
the former eect while in non-exporters, the former eect is dominates by the latter eect.
Hence, export rms promotes the division of labor while non-export rms refrain from that.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the model of Shintaku (2015,a) to a trade model with
heterogeneous xed export costs following Jorgensen and Schroder (2008). In the equilib-
rium, exporters and non-exporters coexists and all exporters behave as borderline rms.
Exporters promote the division of labor more strongly than non-exporters. A decrease
in trade costs raises the cut o export xed costs. It reduces the number of rms and
non-exporters, while it raises the number of exporters. It aects not only output of ex-
porters but also that of non-exporters. It expands rm size and promotes the division
of labor of exporters, while it shrinks rm size and make non-exporters refrain from the
division of labor. These links between the cut o xed export costs and the division of
labor of exporters and non-exporters bring a new insight for the research line of trade and
heterogeneous xed export costs.
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5 Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3
If prot of non-exporters is positive and T exists uniquely, the other endogenous variables
also exist uniquely. Hence, we focus on prot of non-exporters and existence and uniqueness
of T .
Positive prot of non-exporters
(6) is can be rewritten as
fe + fxE[j  T ] =  fd + T [G(T ) + 1=H]fx:
By using this, we can rewrite neT j=w of (4) as follows:
[HG(T ) + 1]
neT j
w
= [HG(T ) + 1]

Tfx
H
  fd

:
This implies that neT j=w > 0 is equivalent to T > (Hfd)=fx. Q.E.D.
Existence and uniqueness of T
(6) is can be rewritten as
T [HG(T ) + 1]| {z }
K(T )
=
H
fx
(fe + fd + fxE[j  T ])| {z }
J(T )
: (A.1)
We let K() be T [HG() + 1] and let J() be (H=fx) (fe + fd + fxE[j  ]). We
should note that K 0 > 0, J 0 > 0, J(0) = H(fe + fd)=fx > 0 = K(0). If K 0 > J 0 holds
for all  > 0, T exists uniquely from monotonicity of K and J . Such a situation can be
explained by Figure 1.
We show K 0 > J 0 holds for all  > 0 as follows:
K 0()  J 0() = [(HG() + 1) +H g()]  H
fx
fx
dE[j  ]
d
= [(HG() + 1) +H g()] H g()
=HG() + 1 > 0; for all :
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Relative nal good market clearing and free-entry conditions.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
From 1 <  < 2 of Assumption 1, we can get the following condition:
dH
d
=
1
2   (1 + 
1 )( 1)=(2 ) (1  )| {z }
 
  < 0:
Property 1
(A.1) can be rewritten as
Tfx

G(T ) +
1
H

= fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]:
By dierentiating this equation with respect to  , we can obtain the following equation:
dT
d
fx

G(T ) +
1
H

+ Tfx

g(T )
dT
d
  1
H2
dH
d

= fx
dE[j  T ]
dT
dT
d
From dE[j  T ]=dT = Tg(T ), we can obtain the following equation:
dT
d

fx

G(T ) +
1
H

+ (Tfx)
( 1)
H2
dH
d
= 0: (B.1)
From dH=d < 0, we can obtain dT=d < 0. Q.E.D.
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Property 2
By dierentiating (7) with respect to T , we can obtain the following equations from
dE[j  T ]=dT = Tg(T ):
dMT
dT
=  2BL
2B + 1
dE[j  T ]=dTfx
(fe + fd + fxE[j  T ])2
=  2BL
2B + 1
Tg(T )fx
(fe + fd + fxE[j  T ])2
= MT Tg(T )fx
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ] (B.2)
< 0:
From dT=d < 0, we can obtain
dMT
d
=
dMT
d| {z }
 
d
d|{z}
 
> 0:
From this equation and dT=d < 0, we can obtain
d[1 G(T )]MT
d
=  g(T )dT
d
MT| {z }
cut o eect (+)
+ [1 G(T )]dMT
d| {z }
entry eect (+)
> 0:
From this equation and dT=d < 0, we can obtain
dG(T )MT
d
= g(T )
dT
d
MT| {z }
cut o eect ({)
+ G(T )
dMT
d| {z }
entry eect (+)
=
T
d

g(T )MT +G(T )
dMT
T

=
T
d

g(T )MT  G(T )MT Tg(T )fx
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]

by (B.2)
=
T
d
g(T )MT

1 G(T ) Tfx
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]

=
T
d
g(T )MT

[fe + fd + fxE[j  T ] G(T )Tfx
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]

=
T
d
g(T )MT

[Tfx(G(T ) + 1=H)] G(T )Tfx
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]

by (A.1)
=
T
d|{z}
 
g(T )MT

(Tfx)=H
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]

| {z }
+
< 0:
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Hence, this eect is negative. Q.E.D.
Property 3
By substituting T for y
ne
T j of (3), we can obtain the following equations:
yneT =

fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]
A(HG(T ) + 1)
2
=
1
A2

fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]
(HG(T ) + 1)
2
=
f 2x
A2H2

H
fx
fe + fd + fxE[j  T ]
(HG(T ) + 1)
2
=

fxT
AH
2
: (B.3)
By dierentiating (B.3) with respect to  , we can obtain
dyneT
d
= 2

fxT
AH

fx
A
  z }| {
(dT=d)H   T
 z }| {
(dH=d)
H2
:
Hence, dyneT =d > 0( 0) is equivalent to (dT=d)H > () T (dH=d). This is equivalent
to
 (dH=H)
(d=)| {z }
(+)
> ()  (dT=T )
(d=)| {z }
(+)
: (B.4)
That is, dyneT =d depends on whether elasticity of aT for  is grater than that of H.
From (B.3) and (1), we can obtain
yet;T = (H + 1)
2yneT =

fxT
A
H + 1
H
2
:
By dierentiating this equation with respect to  , we can obtain the following equation
dyet;T
d
= 2

H + 1
H
fxT
A

fx
A
2664H + 1H dTd| {z }
 
+
d[(H + 1)=H]
d
T| {z }
+
3775 ;
where d[(H + 1)=H]=d =  (dH=d)=H2 > 0.
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Hence, dyet;T=d > 0 () is equivalent to
 (dH=H)
(d=)| {z }
(+)
> ()  (H + 1)(dT=T )
(d=)| {z }
(+)
: (B.5)
Hence, (B.5) demands more stronger price eect to attain dyet;T=d > 0 than (B.4). That
is, (B.5) more tends to attain dyet;T=d < 0 more than (B.4).
We analyze the relation in magnitudes between the elasticity of H and aT for  . We
can rewrite (B.1) as follows
 dT
d

T
(HG(T ) + 1) =  dH
d

H
(B.6)
(B.6) implies the elasticity of H for  is grater than that of aT . From this result and (B.4),
we can obtain dyneT =d > 0. This leads to dt
ne
T =d > 0.
We can rewrite (B.6) as follows:
 (dH=H)
(d=)
  ( 1)(H + 1)(dT=T )
(d=)
=  (dT=T )
(dT=d)
(HG(T ) + 1)  ( 1)(H + 1)(dT=T )
(d=)
by (B.6)
=  d(T=T )
(dT=d)
[[HG(T ) + 1]  (H + 1)]
= d(T=T )
(dT=d)| {z }
(+)
H [G(T )  1]| {z }
( )
< 0:
Hence, these equations and (B.5) derive dyet;T=d < 0. This leads to dt
e
T=d > 0. Q.E.D.
107
